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Physicians Treating Physicians: 
Information and Incentives in Childbirth†
By Erin M. Johnson and M. Marit Rehavi*
This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient 
information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata 
on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are 
patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit 
the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treat-
ment gap varies with providers’ financial incentives. Consistent with 
induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely 
to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to 
differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of 
nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians 
also have better health outcomes. (JEL D83, I11, J16, J44)
As much as $210 billion, or nearly 10 cents of every health dollar, may be spent on “medically unnecessary” treatment (IOM 2012, Table S-1). Childbirth is the 
most common reason for hospitalization in the United States and cesarean sections 
(C-sections) are the most common inpatient surgery. Four million babies are born 
each year, resulting in $50 billion in health care costs (Truven Health Analytics 
2013). The nature of decision making in childbirth makes it particularly well-suited 
to testing for distortions to care. In addition, the large variation in C-section rates 
across time and place has led to concerns about their overuse. In 2013, C-section 
rates ranged from a low of 22.4 percent in Utah to a high of 38.9 percent in Louisiana, 
and much of this variation is unexplained.
Given concerns about overuse, a natural question is whether physician-mothers 
choose the same treatment for themselves and their patients. They do not. We find 
that physicians are less likely to get C-sections and have better health outcomes than 
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comparable nonphysicians. In addition, nonphysician-patients’ treatment intensity 
covaries with their providers’ financial incentives, while physician-patients appear 
unaffected. Our preferred explanation for these findings is that physician-patients 
are more informed about the appropriate level of care. Even among physicians, 
those in specialties with the more relevant medical knowledge receive the less inten-
sive treatment.
This paper provides new evidence on the physician induced demand (PID) 
hypothesis and the role of patient information in treatment. PID posits that phy-
sicians can shift patient demand and move treatment quantity in the direction of 
their own interests because patients do not have the necessary medical knowledge 
to make independent decisions. Many studies document physicians’ responses to 
financial incentives, but only a few have directly tested for PID (see McGuire 2000 
and McClellan 2011 for reviews) and even fewer have measured health impacts.1 
We do both. We provide direct evidence on PID by measuring the difference in 
informed and uninformed patients’ treatment across incentive environments and 
explore its consequences for patient health.
We present a simple model to illustrate the interaction between financial incen-
tives and patient information in childbirth. Physicians can increase their income 
by recommending intensive treatment, but face a cost to patient satisfaction if they 
make an inappropriate recommendation to an informed patient. The model predicts 
OBs will recommend too many (few) C-sections when they are positively (nega-
tively) reimbursed on the margin relative to vaginal deliveries. The model also pre-
dicts that the amount of overuse (or underuse) is decreasing in patient information.
To test these predictions, we use new micro-data on hospital births in California 
paired with confidential data from Texas. Together these states account for almost 
25 percent of US births. First, we compare the C-section rate of  physician-mothers 
with that of comparable nonphysicians. C-sections are typically more highly reim-
bursed than vaginal deliveries under fee-for-service (FFS), and physician-patients 
are more informed regarding their need for the procedure. Thus, in FFS the model 
predicts lower C-section rates for physician-mothers. We then examine how demand 
inducement differs across financial incentive environments. Specifically, we com-
pare the gap in C-section rates between physician- and nonphysician-mothers inside 
and outside of a large system of HMO-owned hospitals in California. In contrast 
with FFS, in HMO-owned hospitals C-sections are less financially favorable to 
physicians and to the hospital, because the hospital internalizes the costs of care 
and incentivizes the physicians it employs accordingly. This directly tests whether 
the intersection of patient information and physician financial incentives is respon-
sible for the treatment differences. Finally, we compare the health outcomes of 
 physician-mothers and their infants with those of nonphysician-patients to ascertain 
whether they are consistent with receiving more optimal treatment.
We find that physician-mothers are 7–9 percent less likely to have a C-section 
than other highly educated patients. The C-section rate even varies among 
 physician-patients with the relevance of their medical knowledge.  Physician-patients 
1 Notable exceptions are Jacobson et al. (2013) and Clemens and Gottlieb (2014). 
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in specialties with the most relevant expertise have lower C-section rates. Physicians’ 
lower C-section rates stem not from different preferences for attempting labor, but 
instead come from C-sections performed after an attempt at labor (herein “unsched-
uled C-sections”). Differential sorting of patients to hospitals or physicians can 
explain only 20 percent of the treatment gap. Finally, measures of treatment inten-
sity suggest physician-patients are not achieving fewer C-sections by utilizing other 
forms of intensive treatment.
We also find a stark difference in the impact of the incentive environment. 
Nonphysicians have a higher C-section rate in hospitals where there is a financial 
incentive to perform C-sections. However, physician-patients appear to be unaf-
fected by the financial environment (they have the same risk-adjusted C-section 
rate inside and outside of HMO-owned hospitals). These results suggest that, while 
financial incentives are an important determinant of treatment, patient information 
is an effective counterweight.
The consequences of these treatment differences are not only financial. 
 Physician-mothers and their infants have lower morbidity than other patients. 
It also appears that physicians achieve these outcomes without using more hos-
pital resources. Controlling for method of delivery, the hospital charges for 
 physician-births are similar to those of nonphysicians.
Physicians and nonphysicians likely differ in many respects, including malprac-
tice concerns, time costs, risk preferences, and selection of providers. Any of these 
might explain a single finding in isolation, but, as we discuss below, they do not fit 
the full pattern of results.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in five sections. Section I describes the 
clinical and institutional setting. In Section II, we summarize the existing literature 
and present the theoretical framework. Section III describes the data and empirical 
framework. Section IV presents the results, V discusses them, and VI concludes.
I. Clinical and Institutional Setting
C-section rates have increased from one in five births in 1996 to nearly one in 
three. The states we study, California and Texas, have C-section rates of 33.2 per-
cent and 35.3 percent, respectively (Martin et al. 2013). Notable unexplained varia-
tion has been documented across hospitals and across physicians within geographic 
areas (Baicker, Buckles, and Chandra 2006; Epstein and Nicholson 2009; and 
Kozhimannil et al. 2013). While the optimal rate is unknown, many experts believe 
C-sections are overused. The United States Department of Health and Human 
Services repeatedly includes reducing C-section rates in its Healthy People goals. 
The 2020 goal is a 10 percent reduction. However, as the Chief OB for Sutter Health 
noted: “Cesarean birth ends up being a profit center in hospitals, so there’s not a lot 
of incentive to reduce them” (Giron 2009).
Medical decision making during childbirth is especially well-suited to testing 
for inducement. Unlike most medical conditions, childbirth occurs for an unambig-
uous, predefined population (pregnant women) and treatment must occur within a 
narrow time frame. Thus, the scope for inducement exists only on the intensive mar-
gin. There is a well-documented payment wedge for C-sections relative to  vaginal 
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deliveries under FFS and an information asymmetry between OBs and patients. 
Less-informed patients typically cannot even reduce the asymmetry by seeking an 
independent second opinion during labor. Physician-patients, in contrast, are more 
likely to know which treatment is appropriate for them. They have direct medical 
knowledge of childbirth, as obstetric rotations are part of the core curriculum in 
US medical schools and residency programs. Physicians’ medical training may also 
equip them to better understand and evaluate treatment options and their implica-
tions. Bronnenberg et al. (2015) document large asymmetries between experts and 
the average consumer in understanding even the basic fact that generic and brand 
name drugs are equivalent. Medical care in childbirth requires far more nuanced 
knowledge, suggesting asymmetries in this context are likely large. Moreover, 
unlike treatment for many acute conditions, patients are conscious during labor and 
thus their information has the potential to affect treatment.
In childbirth, the primary treatment decision is whether to perform a vaginal 
delivery or a C-section. There are several clinical situations in which a C-section 
is clearly indicated, and the medical guidelines recommend scheduling a C-section 
before labor begins for many of them.2 In California, 10 percent of first-time moth-
ers have scheduled C-sections; the remaining 90 percent attempt vaginal delivery. 
An attempt at vaginal delivery begins with the natural onset of labor or medical 
induction of labor (15 percent of first births in California are induced). If at any 
point the OB believes the risks associated with continuing labor outweigh the bene-
fits, she can recommend progressing to surgery. C-sections after a trial of labor are 
termed unscheduled C-sections. Some of these are emergency C-sections, in the 
sense that not immediately progressing to surgery would likely compromise health, 
but most unscheduled C-sections are not emergent.
C-sections clearly improve maternal and infant outcomes in some clinical situa-
tions (e.g., uterine rupture), but guidelines regarding the decision to leave the deliv-
ery room for the operating room are often ambiguous.3 The benefit of the C-section 
must be weighed against the risks of maternal mortality and morbidity associated 
with major abdominal surgery. While maternal mortality rates are very low, they 
are estimated to be two to four times higher in C-sections than in vaginal delivery 
(Hall and Bewley 1999). Mothers are also more likely to be rehospitalized for infec-
tion, for cardiopulmonary and thromboembolitic conditions, and for surgical wound 
complications after a C-section (Lydon-Rochelle et al. 2000). In addition, recovery 
times and hospital stays are twice as long for cesarean deliveries, and C-sections 
may increase the risk of complications in future pregnancies as well as the ability 
to become pregnant (Ananth, Smulian, and Vintzileos 1997; Nielsen, Hagberg, and 
Ljungblad 1989; Alpay, Saed, and Diamond 2008; HCUP 2009; and Norberg and 
Pantano 2013). C-sections also carry risks for infants. For example, 1.1 percent of 
2 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) recommends cesarean delivery before a 
trial of labor in first births for: breech or transverse lie, placenta previa, triplets and higher order multiples, uterine 
rupture, certain rare maternal cardiac or neurologic conditions, or a history of certain uterine surgeries. 
3 While guidelines for managing shoulder dystocia are quite clear, guidelines for cases when the first stage 
of labor fails to progress, or when the second stage of labor progresses past 1 or 2 hours are lacking. Even when 
guidelines are clear, as in cases of oxygen deprivation, monitoring typically provides only a noisy indicator of fetal 
distress (Prentice and Lind 1987). 
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infants delivered by cesarean are injured in the procedure (Alexander et al. 2006). 
However, these risks and costs must be weighed against the uncertain consequences 
of allowing labor to progress.
In FFS payment schemes, physicians are typically reimbursed more highly for 
C-sections than for vaginal delivery.4 This difference in fees is not thought to be jus-
tified by increased costs incurred by the OB in a cesarean delivery. C-sections require 
surgical training and may be a more complex procedure, but they take less time on 
average, and the timing is more predictable.5 Thus, the raw payment differential 
may even understate the difference in effective wage rates across the procedures.
In California, 15 percent of births take place in an HMO-owned hospital set-
ting, where the HMO directly operates the hospital.6 In this setting both physicians 
and hospitals have an incentive to perform vaginal deliveries in lieu of C-sections. 
According to the HMO, 95 percent of their physicians are paid by salary (as of 
2006), and medical groups with costs under budget are eligible for additional com-
pensation. Furthermore, since the hospital is owned by the insurance company, it 
internalizes the cost of care provided.
C-sections consume more hospital resources than vaginal deliveries. Average 
hospital charges are $6,000 higher for a C-section (Baicker, Buckles, and Chandra 
2006).7 Hospital costs associated with C-sections are estimated to be approximately 
$1,000 higher for uncomplicated deliveries and $3,000 higher for complicated 
deliveries (Podulka, Stranges, and Steiner 2011). These numbers are conservative 
(they only include direct medical costs), yet even they suggest reducing C-sections 
to their 1996 levels could save between $1 and $3 billion per year.
II. Literature and Theoretical Framework
A. Literature
The concept of induced demand is first attributed to Evans (1974). McGuire 
(2000) defines PID as: “when the physician influences a patient’s demand for care 
against the physician’s interpretation of the best interests of the patient” (McGuire 
2000, 504). Physicians can effect such a shift because patients must rely on the 
physician to inform them of their treatment options and their expected risks and 
benefits.
In an ideal world, the econometrician would compare actual treatment quantity 
with the quantity the physician believes the patient would demand if she were per-
fectly informed. Because this is often not observable even ex post, empirical tests for 
4 Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin (1999) report a difference of $500 on average. A more recent estimate from the 
Healthcare Blue Book is $380. This is close to the differential reported by Medicare (for patients eligible for SSDI): 
Medicare pays physicians $2,295 for a C-section versus $1,926 for a vaginal delivery on average. 
5 The Medicare Resource-Based Relative Value scale assigns a higher score to C-sections than to vaginal deliv-
eries (49.26 versus 43.78), but there is some debate regarding whether this reflects the difference in true work or 
complexity between the two procedures. Source: www.physicianspractice.com/display/article/1462168/1589375. 
6 Another 37 percent of all births are to patients insured by an HMO, but delivering in a non-HMO-owned 
hospital. 
7 In California average charges for the mother are $8,472 higher. According to Truven Health Analytics, hospital 
and physician payments made by commercial insurers were $6,000 higher on average in California. 
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PID have followed one of two approaches. The first exploits variation in physicans’ 
incentives to induce.8 For example, Gruber and Owings (1996) exploit the shock to 
OB incomes resulting from the secular decline in fertility rates in the 1970s. They 
find that a 5 percent fall in incomes leads physicians to increase the C-section rate 
by 1 percentage point. A related test for inducement exploits changes in physician 
fees.9 Physicians have been found to make up lost revenue by increasing volume 
(Nguyen and Derrick 1997; Yip 1998; Jacobson et al. 2010). In contrast, Gruber, 
Kim, and Mayzlin (1999) find C-sections increased by 0.7 percentage points in 
response to a $100 increase in the Medicaid fee differential. In both of the above 
approaches, identification comes from the reaction of physicians to a shock; they are 
not estimates of the overall level of PID.
The second broad approach to testing for PID uses variation in the information 
asymmetry necessary for physicians to induce demand. Studies have compared 
the treatment physicians choose (or would choose) for themselves with the treat-
ment nonphysicians receive in general (Bunker and Brown 1973; Hay and Leahy 
1982; Ubel, Angott, and Zikmund-Fisher 2011) and in childbirth (Chou et al 2006; 
Grytten, Skau, and Sørensen 2011). For example, in a Swiss survey, Domenigetti 
et al. (1993) find that physicians report receiving one of seven major surgical inter-
ventions one-third less often than nonphysicians. This empirical approach has also 
been employed more generally to test for agency problems when employing experts 
(Levitt and Syverson 2008). This paper merges the two broad approaches in the 
existing literature by jointly varying the ability and the incentive to induce demand.
The above studies highlight the role of physicians’ financial incentives in treat-
ment decisions. Financial remuneration, however, is unlikely to be the only factor in 
the physicians’ calculation of the marginal costs and benefits of treatment choices. 
For example, malpractice risk has received considerable attention. However, in 
childbirth even the largest empirical estimates are relatively small (Avraham, Dafny, 
and Schanzenbach 2012). Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann (1999) and Sloan et 
al. (1997) find small increases, Kim (2007) finds no effect of malpractice risk on 
C-sections, and Currie and MacLeod (2008) finds malpractice pressure leads to siz-
able decreases in C-sections.
B. Theoretical framework
In PID models, treatment quantities are determined in equilibrium by physicians 
equating the marginal cost of inducing demand with its marginal benefit (McGuire 
2000). Models differ in how they incorporate the cost of inducement. Some incor-
porate the cost directly in the utility function (Ellis and McGuire 1986; McGuire 
and Pauly 1991; Gruber and Owings 1996), while others model patients’ refusal 
of unwarranted care (Dranove 1988) or their future demand for that physician’s 
services (Pauly 1980).
8 Numerous authors have documented a positive cross-sectional correlation between physician supply and the 
use of surgery (Fuchs 1978; Rossiter and Wilensky 1983; and Cromwell and Mitchell 1986). Following Dranove 
and Wehner’s (1994) critique, this empirical approach was superseded by studies exploiting exogenous shocks. 
9 The positive covariance of treatment with fees is consistent with PID, but it is also consistent with models 
without asymmetric information (McGuire 2000). 
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In the spirit of McGuire and Pauly (1991), we model the cost of inducement as a 
direct argument in the physician’s utility function. Our model differs in that it explic-
itly incorporates patient information in order to illustrate the relationship between 
financial incentives, information, and demand inducement. Each patient’s need for 
a C-section is denoted by the index  z , which is distributed across patients accord-
ing to  f(z ) . Let  _ z be the clinically optimal threshold for performing a C-section (a 
C-section maximizes patient health for all patients with  z i ≥  _ z). For simplicity, 
assume that OBs perfectly observe  z i . Only a fraction of patients,  p , observe  z i and 
the remainder of patients are uninformed.10
OBs are risk neutral and their utility functions equally weight profits and patient 
satisfaction as follows:11
  u i ( c i ,  r i ) =  c i π +  {  r i (g( z i −  





where  r i and  c i are indicators equal to one when the OB recommends and performs a 
C-section, respectively.  π is the profit differential between a C-section and a vaginal 
birth, and  g is an increasing function that preserves origin symmetry. The second 
and third terms of the utility from treating an informed patient represent patient 
satisfaction with her OB’s advice. Dissatisfaction with a clinically inappropriate 
recommendation is increasing in the patient’s distance from the optimal threshold.12
An informed patient will only consent to clinically appropriate treatment, while 
an uninformed patient will defer to her OB:
  c i =  { i[  z i ≥  
_ z]  informed  r i   uninformed. 
When deciding whether to recommend treatment, the OB does not know whether 
an individual patient is informed. The OB observes the set of patient characteristics, 
x , and forms an expectation that the patient is informed based on those characteris-
tics:  E(  p i |  x i ) =  p ˆi . The OB then chooses  r i to maximize her expected utility:
  max  r i  
  (1 −  p ˆi ) r i π +  p ˆi [i [ z i ≥  _ z] π +  r i g( z i −  _ z) + (1 −  r i )g (−( z i −  _ z)) ] 
The OB will recommend a C-section to patients with
  z i ≥  _ z +  g −1 ( − (1 −  p ˆi )π  _________2  p ˆi  ) .
10 We assume the probability a patient is informed is independent of the patient’s health. The comparative statics 
are robust to assuming that OBs only have a noisy signal of  z i , as long as the precision of the signal is independent 
of whether the patient is informed. One could also consider a model in which all patients have imprecise signals 
of their health and update their beliefs based on physician advice. Dranove (1988) solves the strategic game that 
results from this set-up. While closed form solutions are not possible in the general case, the model makes similar 
predictions. Specifically, it predicts demand inducement will be decreasing in patient information. 
11 Neither is necessary for the predictions that follow. 
12 Patient satisfaction could enter the OB’s utility function either due to reputation concerns or due to the disut-
ility of interacting with a disgruntled patient. One could also imagine a more elaborate utility function in which an 
altruistic physician might also care about patient welfare. Allowing patient welfare to directly enter the physician’s 
utility function affects the level of inducement, but does not affect the predictions that follow. 
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Let  z i d denote the OB’s cut-off for recommending a C-section to patient  i :  z i d =  _ z + 
 g −1 ( κ i ) with  κ i =  − (1 −  p ˆi )π _______2  p ˆi  . The resulting C-section rate will negatively covary 
with  z i d .13
The OB thus chooses the clinically optimal C-section threshold  ( z i d =  _ z) in the 
case of no financial incentive ( π = 0 ) and perfectly informed patients (  p ˆi = 1 ). 
Note that if there are other frictions in the market, the preferred C-section rate of 
perfectly informed patients may not be the clinical optimum, but the comparative 
statics will still hold. This model abstracts away from these factors to highlight the 
impact of information and financial incentives.
When  π is greater (less) than 0,  z i d is less (greater) than  _ z , and the OB performs 
too many (few) C-sections. The OB’s treatment threshold also varies with  p ˆi , the 
expected probability the patient is informed:
(1)  d  z i d  ___
d  p ˆi =  ( ∂ ___ ∂ κ i  g −1 ( κ i )) (  1 __  p ˆi +  1 −  p ˆi  _____ p ˆi 2  )  π __2 .
The sign of  π determines the sign of the derivative, as all other terms are positive. 
Thus, in FFS, where  π > 0 ,  z i d is increasing in  p ˆi , implying the C-section rate is 
decreasing in  p ˆi . The model’s predictions reverse in HMO-owned hospitals, where 
vaginal births are incentivized ( π < 0 ). There  z i d is decreasing in  p ˆi and the result-
ing C-section rate is increasing in  p ˆi .
Figure 1 displays the OB’s cutoff for recommending a C-section as a function 
of  p ˆi for the case where  g( z i −  _ z) is simply  z i −  _ z . Note that even a modest prob-
ability that the patient is informed leads the OB to self-regulate and not recom-
mend inappropriate care in the most clear-cut situations. Also note that OBs choose 
 cut-offs that are further from the optimum when treating patients who are less likely 
to be informed. In FFS (HMO-owned hospitals), this results in a C-section rate that 
is higher (lower) for uninformed patients. The incentive environment does not affect 
the C-section rate of fully informed patients.
If clinical standards are chosen to maximize patient health, deviations from the 
clinical optimum will result in worse patient outcomes. Thus, the model also pre-
dicts that less informed patients should have higher morbidity.
III. Data and Methodology
A. Data
In order to test the above predictions, one needs to observe the treatments and 
outcomes of patients who differ in their likelihood of being informed about the 
appropriateness of treatment. Physicians’ medical training makes them much more 
likely than the average person to have clinical knowledge, and their profession 
is visible to OBs. We therefore use being a physician as a proxy for the patient’s 
probability of being informed. We identified physician-patients by merging the 
13 Informed patients have a C-section rate of  1 − f( _ z) . Uninformed patients with  z i >  z i d receive a C-section. 
Thus, as long as there are some uninformed patients, the C-section rate rises as  z i d falls.
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 confidential California Vital Statistics (VS) data with licensure data on physicians 
practicing in the state.14 Specifically, we merge the California confidential Linked 
Patient Discharge Data-Birth Cohort File (PDD-Birth) with the California Medical 
Board database of all licensed physicians in the state. In addition to the full name, 
the mother’s ZIP code, approximate age, and education were used in the merge 
process. A detailed description of the merge process is provided in the online Data 
Appendix.
The linked data include the VS record for every birth registered in California from 
1996–2005. Births taking place in hospitals are linked to the mother and infant’s 
hospital discharge records. The VS record includes maternal and paternal demo-
graphic information, maternal pregnancy history, pregnancy risk factors, and deliv-
ery complications. The data also has information on the birth, including method of 
delivery. The linked patient discharge data adds up to 24 diagnoses and 20 procedure 
codes for the mother and the infant. The data also include patient insurance type and 
hospital charges. See Table 1 for the full list of variables.
Due to the path dependence of treatment in second births, we focus on first births. 
There were 2,029,298 registered singleton first births over 20 weeks gestation in 
California hospitals in the sample period. Given the time needed to complete medical 
school, there are almost no physicians in their early twenties. We therefore restrict 
the sample to the 1,059,056 mothers between 24 and 45 years of age and exclude 
14 It was not possible to reliably identify physician-fathers in the VS data because the confidential PDD-Birth 
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Figure 1. Physician Threshold and Presence of Informed Patients
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Table 1—Summary Statistics: California
Non-HMO hospitals HMO hospitals
Physicians Nonphysicians Physicians Nonphysicians
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Demographics:
Age 32.55* [3.92] 31.11* [4.25] 32.60* [4.07] 30.67* [4.26]
Mother’s education (%):
 Some college 0 [0] 11.81* [32.27] 0 [0] 12.51* [33.08]
 College graduate 0 [0] 44.69* [49.72] 0 [0] 42.23* [49.39]
 High education 100 [0] 38.38* [48.63] 100 [0] 40.08* [49.01]
Father’s education (%):
 Some college 4.99* [21.78] 13.00* [33.63] 4.81* [21.41] 16.98* [37.55]
 College graduate 16.59* [37.21] 39.67* [48.92] 19.42* [39.60] 37.20* [48.34]
 High education 71.69* [45.06] 37.62* [48.44] 71.35* [45.26] 34.16* [47.42]
Mother’s race (%):
 Black 3.47 [18.31] 2.99 [17.02] 5.77 [23.34] 6.17 [24.05]
 Hispanic 6.11* [23.96] 13.79* [34.48] 7.31* [26.05] 17.80* [38.25]
 Other (nonwhite) 38.76* [48.73] 26.04* [43.89] 47.31* [49.98] 28.93* [45.34]
ZIP code income ($) 34,567* [15,538] 29,517* [13,760] 33,882* [13,914] 26,646* [10,974]
Insurance (%):
 HMO 42.99 [49.51] 43.99 [49.64] 98.46 [12.32] 98.37 [12.65]
 Government 3.58* [18.58] 8.53* [27.93] 0 [0] 0.31 [5.55]
 Indigent 0 [0] 0.024 [1.55] 0 [0] 0.0035 [0.59]
infant information (%):
Female 48.34 [49.98] 48.57 [49.98] 50.00 [50.05] 48.74 [49.98]
Very early term
 (20–36 weeks)
8.10 [27.29] 7.71 [26.67] 9.62 [29.51] 8.59 [28.02]
Early term (37–39 weeks) 25.45* [43.57] 21.78* [41.28] 22.88 [42.05] 19.76 [39.82]
Post-dates ( ≥ 42 weeks) 5.82* [23.42] 6.87* [25.29] 5.77* [23.34] 8.26* [27.53]
Very low birth weight 0.90 [9.47] 1.01 [9.98] 0.96 [9.77] 1.24 [11.07]
Low birth weight 5.10 [22.00] 4.41 [20.53] 8.65* [28.14] 5.00* [21.80]
High birth weight 5.82* [23.42] 8.97* [28.58] 6.35* [24.40] 9.77* [29.68]
Prenatal care 99.71 [5.37] 99.78 [4.73] 100.00 [0] 99.73 [5.22]
risk factors (%):
Malpositioned fetus 4.38 [20.46] 4.57 [20.89] 3.85 [19.25] 4.11 [19.84]
Gestational diabetes 4.41 [20.54] 4.69 [21.14] 5.77 [23.34] 7.07 [25.62]
Eclampsia 0.036 [1.90] 0.081 [2.84] 0.39 [6.20] 0.19 [4.40]
Smoking/substance abuse 0.15 [3.80] 0.19 [4.31] 1.54 [12.32] 1.43 [11.88]
Hypertension 
 /preeclampsia
5.53 [22.86] 5.78 [23.34] 7.31 [26.05] 7.54 [26.40]
Congenital anomaly 0.15 [3.80] 0.081 [2.84] 0 [0] 0.12 [3.39]
Rupture/hemorrhage 1.41 [11.79] 1.18 [10.82] 2.11* [14.40] 1.16* [10.70]
Ruptured membranes
  ≥ 24 hours
2.24 [14.81] 2.27 [14.88] 3.85 [19.25] 4.22 [20.10]
Isoimmunity 1.81 [13.33] 1.89 [13.61] 0.39 [6.20] 1.07 [10.27]
Oligohydramnios 3.80* [19.10] 3.10* [17.30] 5.77* [23.30] 3.90* [19.40]
Polyhydramnios 0.43 [6.57] 0.32 [5.63] 0.39 [6.20] 0.26 [5.11]
Growth restriction 2.82* [16.56] 1.51* [12.21] 2.69* [16.20] 1.21* [10.91]
Thyroid condition 2.39* [15.26] 1.49* [12.13] 2.12 [14.40] 1.85 [13.46]
Herpes 0.47 [6.84] 0.51 [7.15] 0.96 [9.78] 1.43 [11.85]
Asthma 1.27 [11.18] 0.94 [9.63] 2.89 [16.75] 2.87 [16.69]
Preexisting
 physical factors
1.95* [13.84] 1.46* [12.00] 2.69* [16.20] 1.18* [10.81]
Other preexisting
 conditions
1.45 [11.94] 1.11 [10.48] 1.73 [13.05] 0.98 [9.82]
Observations 2,766 494,077 520 85,165
notes: Table contains independent variables used in the main empirical analysis for the main estimation sample. 
Notably, the sample is limited to singleton first births to mothers who are at least 24 years of age in families with at 
least one college graduate parent. “Preexisting physical factors” includes previous uterine scar and maternal phys-
ical anomalies. “Other preexisting conditions” includes maternal heart disease, renal disease, and liver disease.
*  Denotes differences in physician and nonphysician means that are significantly different from zero at the 
5 percent level.
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observations with missing maternal age, ZIP code, gestational age, or  birthweight.15 
Finally, to reduce concerns about the comparability of physicians and nonphysicians 
our preferred sample is the 582,528 births to parents with at least 1 college degree 
between them, although this choice of comparison group is not essential for the 
results that follow. Of these, 3,286 mothers are identified as physicians in the prob-
abilistic record linkage.
Table 1 summarizes the independent variables used in the analysis. In our sample, 
15.8 percent of physician-patients and 14.7 percent of nonphysicians deliver in an 
HMO-owned hospital. The differences between physicians and nonphysicians are 
substantively similar in these two settings. Physicians are older, less likely to be his-
panic, and live in ZIP codes with higher income per capita. By definition, physicians 
are all highly educated. The fathers of their children are also more highly educated 
than those of nonphysician-mothers.
Physicians give birth to infants with lower gestational ages and lower birth 
weights on average. In terms of clinical risk factors, physicians and nonphysicians 
are fairly similar.16 Outside of HMO-owned hospitals, 4 of 17 physician/nonphy-
sician differences are significant at the 5 percent level. Physicians have higher rates 
of oligohydramnios, growth restriction, thyroid conditions, and preexisting physical 
factors. Inside HMO-owned hospitals, differences are slightly larger and the signif-
icant differences are placental/uterine rupture and hemorrhage, oligohydramnios, 
growth-restriction, and preexisting maternal factors.
We complement the California data with VS data on all births in Texas from 
1996–2003 and 2005–2007 (summarized in online Appendix Table A.1). 2004 is 
excluded because the hospital identifier was not available for that year. The Texas 
data come solely from the birth certificate and its associated survey. The data are 
less detailed and, most notably, it is not possible to reliably classify C-sections as 
scheduled or unscheduled. In addition, the following variables are unavailable: uter-
ine rupture/hemorrhage; ruptured membranes over 24 hours; isoimmunity; oligo-
hydramnios, polyhydramnios; growth restriction; thyroid condition; herpes, asthma, 
preexisting maternal physical factors; and other maternal preexisting conditions. 
However, the Texas data have some important variables that are unavailable in 
California. The name of the attending OB (after 2004) and the self-reported occupa-
tions of both parents are available in the confidential data. We identify 2,619 births 
to  physician-mothers, 5,905 births to physician-fathers and 1,472 births in families 
with two physician-parents. We were also able to merge in the physician-patient’s 
specialty for 77 percent of mothers and 75 percent of fathers. This allows us to fur-
ther refine our proxy for patient information, as some specialties are more likely to 
be informed about the specifics of childbirth.
15 There are 918,098 births to women under 24 and 142 births to women over 45. 
16 We exclude failure of the labor to progress, obstruction, and non-reassuring fetal heart rate. These are subjec-
tive and potentially endogenous to the treatment decision, particularly when physicians need to justify a C-section 
with a diagnosis code. 
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B. Econometric Model
We first estimate OLS regressions of a binary indicator for C-section on an indi-
cator for whether the mother is a physician along with demographic and clinical 
 controls. For the initial analysis, we focus on births occurring outside of  HMO-owned 
hospitals. OLS regressions are of the following form:
(2)  y iht = α + β  D iht +  x iht ′ γ +  δ t +  ϵ iht ,
where  y iht is a dummy variable indicating whether patient  i had a C-section in hospi-
tal  h at time  t .  D iht is a dummy indicating if the delivering mother is a physician, and 
x iht is the set of all the variables listed in Table 1 including maternal demographics, 
infant information, and clinical risk factors.  x iht also includes interactions between 
ZIP code income and race and clinical risk factors interacted with age, race, and 
ZIP code.17  δ t is a vector of year-month fixed effects. Hospital fixed effects,  ν h , 
are included as indicated in tables.  β is the coefficient of interest. It is the esti-
mate of the difference in C-section rates for physicians and nonphysicians outside 
of  HMO-owned hospitals. As discussed above, if physician-patients are more likely 
to be informed (  p ˆmd >  p ˆnon−md ), the model predicts  β < 0 .18
The regressions above employ a fairly flexible functional form. However, there 
could be complex interactions between observed risk factors and demographics. For 
this reason, we also estimate nonparametric nearest neighbor matching regressions. 
This approach exploits the large size of the control group (nonphysicians) relative 
to the treatment group (physicians). Specifically, we estimate the average treatment-
on-treated (TOT) effect by matching each physician with the closest comparable 
nonphysician on a rich vector of demographic and clinical variables. This vector 
includes a full set of 2-year age bins, education and race indicators, clinical risk 
factors, term length indicators, indicators for low and high birthweight, and 5-year 
time bins. The TOT estimator is calculated as the mean difference in C-section rates 
between treatment and control observations in the matched sample.19
To test whether physicians’ treatment covaries with the treating physician’s finan-
cial environment, we next turn to the full sample of patients (delivering inside and 
outside of HMO-owned hospitals). We estimate the following OLS regression:
(3)  y iat = α +  β 1  D iat +  β 2  D iat × HM O iat +  β 3 HM O iat +  x iat ′ γ +  δ t +  ϵ iat ,
where  HM O iat is a variable indicating whether the birth for patient  i in hospital 
service area (HSA)  a at time  t took place in an HMO-owned hospital. Where indi-
cated, fixed effects for the patient’s HSA are also included. HSAs are used in lieu of 
hospital fixed effects because the latter are collinear with the HMO-owned hospital 
17 The results are not dependent on including interactions in the regression. 
18   p ˆnon−md need not be zero for these predictions to hold, and in fact highly educated families are likely to have 
some information regarding childbirth. 
19 The Mahlanobis measure is used to determine closeness. In cases of multiple exact matches, a weighted aver-
age of exact matches is used as the control observation. Analytical standard errors are calculated following Equation 
14 of Abadie and Imbens (2006). 
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indicator.20 As before, we expect lower C-section rates for physicians relative to 
nonphysicians outside of HMO-owned hospitals ( β 1 < 0 ). We also expect lower 
C-section rates for nonphysicians in HMO-owned hospitals, where there is a finan-
cial incentive to do fewer C-sections on the margin, compared with nonphysicians 
delivering elsewhere ( β 3 < 0 ). Because informed patients should be unaffected by 
the incentive environment, the model predicts more intense treatment for informed 
patients relative to less-informed patients inside of HMO-owned hospitals. If 
informed patients are unaffected by the incentive environment, then  β 2 +  β 3 = 0 .
Finally, we examine how physicians’ morbidity compares with that of nonphy-
sicians. Because the patient morbidity measures we observe are rare and the linear 
probability model performs poorly with low frequency events, we estimate logit 
regressions of the form:
(4)  logit( i iat ) = α +  β 1  D iat +  β 2  D iat × HM O iat +  β 3 HM O iat +  x iat ′ γ +  δ t ,
where  i iat is an indicator variable for a maternal or infant morbid condition for 
patient  i in HSA  a at time  t . The remaining variables are defined as in equation (3). 
Informed patients should have fewer adverse outcomes both in and outside of 
 HMO-owned hospitals if inappropriate levels of care affect morbidity. If instead the 
marginal treatment is in the “flat of the curve,” then there would not be differential 
morbidity for informed patients.
IV. Results
A. Treatment intensity
Table 2 summarizes raw C-section rates of physician and nonphysician parents. 
Consistent with PID, physicians in California have lower C-section rates relative to 
nonphysicians outside of HMO-owned hospitals (1.7 ppts) and higher rates inside 
them (4.9 ppts). Overall C-section rates in Texas are higher, but physician-parents in 
Texas also have lower raw C-section rates compared with nonphysicians. Finally, in 
California nonphysicians inside HMO-owned hospitals have much lower C-section 
rates than those outside of HMO-owned hospitals (3 ppts).
These raw comparisons are in line with our model’s predictions. Next, we turn to 
OLS regressions with the full set of controls for observed demographic and clinical 
factors described in Section III. In all specifications, the comparison group is non-
physicians between 24 and 45 years of age in families with at least 1  college-educated 
parent.
OLS estimates of equation (2) are in Table 3, panel A. Consistent with PID, 
physician-mothers have C-section rates that are 2.14 percentage points (7 percent) 
lower than educated nonphysicians. It is also clear that the reduced C-section rate 
is coming entirely from unscheduled C-sections: physicians have risk-adjusted 
20 An HSA is “a collection of Zip codes whose residents receive most of their hospitalizations from the hospitals 
within that area” (Dartmouth Atlas 2006). There are 3,436 HSAs in the US HSA fixed effects, while not a perfect 
proxy for the hospital, will control for the socioeconomic status of patients in the hospital’s area. 
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Table 2—Raw C-Section Rates
Non-HMO hospitals HMO hospitals
Physicians Nonphysicians Physicians Nonphysicians
Panel A. California
 Any C-section 27.4 29.1 31.0 26.1
[44.6] [45.4] [46.3] [43.9]
 Scheduled C-section 10.9 10.0 12.5 8.1
[31.1] [30.0] [33.1] [27.3]
 Unscheduled C-section 16.6 19.1 18.5 17.9
[37.2] [39.3] [38.8] [38.4]
 Observations 2,766 494,077 520 85,165
Physicians
Panel B. Texas Mothers Fathers Both parents Nonphysicians
 Any C-section 31.6 29.9 28.8 32.7
[46.5] [45.8] [45.3] [46.9]
 Observations 2,619 5,905 1,472 362,349
notes: Mean C-section rates for births to families in which at least one parent is a college graduate. Standard devi-
ations are displayed in brackets.
Source: Authors’ tabulations from California and Texas VS data 
Table 3—C-Sections and Physician-Mothers: California
Any C-section Scheduled Unscheduled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. OLS
 Physician −2.14*** −1.68** 0.016 0.028 −2.16*** −1.71**
[0.79] [0.70] [0.60] [0.55] [0.66] [0.67]
 Hospital fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes
 Observations 496,843 496,843 496,843 496,843 496,843 496,843
 Adjusted  r 2 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.061 0.068
Panel B. Matching
 Physician −2.18*** −1.81* −0.19 0.34 −1.99*** −1.84***
[0.87] [0.99] [0.56] [0.68] [0.78] [0.90]
 Hospital fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes
 Observations 94,360 16,916 94,360 16,916 94,360 16,916
 Exact match rate 89% 53% 89% 53% 89% 53%
notes: The sample is deliveries in non-HMO hospitals. Effects are displayed in percentage points with standard 
errors in brackets. Panel A regressions contain the controls summarized in Table 1, interactions as described in 
Section IIIB, and year × month effects. Standard errors are clustered by hospital. Panel B displays estimates from 
nearest neighbor matching regressions, with matching performed as described in Section IIIB. Abadie and Imbens 
(2006) analytical standard errors are in brackets. The number of observations in panel B refers to those receiving 
nonzero weights. The means of the dependent variables are 29.1 percent (any C-section), 10.0 percent (scheduled 
C-section), and 19.1 percent (unscheduled C-section).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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unscheduled C-section rates that are 2.16 percentage points (11 percent) lower than 
nonphysicians. Thus, the effect is among mothers who have expressed a revealed 
preference for vaginal delivery by attempting labor. It is not the result of differences 
in maternal preferences for elective C-sections. Instead, the difference arises from 
decisions made in the delivery room regarding when to stop laboring and progress to 
surgical delivery.21 This is consistent with the model. While clinical guidelines are 
clear for scheduled C-sections, they are less clear for unscheduled C-sections, and 
there is little time to gather additional information once labor has begun.
C-section rates vary substantially across hospitals within California. We next ask 
whether this treatment difference arises from physician-mothers choosing different 
hospitals or receiving differential treatment within the same hospital. After includ-
ing hospital fixed effects, physicians’ unscheduled C-section rates remain 9 percent 
below those of nonphysicians (Table 3, column 6). Thus, differential sorting does 
not appear to be the primary mechanism behind physicians’ lower C-section rates.
The OLS regressions employ a fairly flexible functional form, however, there 
could still be complex interactions in the relationship between observed risk factors 
and C-sections To address this, we employ nearest neighbor matching estimators, 
which implicitly allow for complex interactions. Table 3, panel B presents TOT 
nearest neighbor matching estimates. Even matching on a rich set of covariates, the 
exact match rate is 89 percent in the main specification (Table 3, panel B, columns 1, 
3, and 5). Regressions that also match on hospital achieve 53 percent exact match 
rates (columns 2, 4, and 6).22 Both sets of results are strikingly similar to the OLS.
These findings are not unique to California. Table 4 presents OLS regression results 
for Texas. The Texas specifications include indicators for both  physician-mothers 
and physician-fathers.23 As in California, the comparison is to nonphysicians in 
families with at least one college degree. Columns 1 and 2 display results for all 
years and columns 3 and 4 for 2005–2007, the period in which the name of the 
attending physician is available. As in California, physician-mothers in Texas have 
significantly lower C-section rates. The difference is 2.79 percentage points over-
all, an 8.5 percent effect. Like in California, controlling for the hospital of delivery 
reduces the point estimate by 25 percent. Even after controlling for the attending 
OB, physician-mothers remain 6.5 percent less likely to receive a C-section.24 This 
suggests the treatment gap arises from physician-patients receiving different treat-
ment rather than selecting different OBs.
One potential concern is that physicians differ from nonphysicians on dimen-
sions in addition to information. We therefore directly test whether treatment inten-
sity varies with medical information. While all physicians are more likely than 
21 The difference in C-section rates does not appear to be driven by differences in medical judgment regarding 
how any single complication should be handled. Instead, it appears as if a different threshold is being applied to 
physician and nonphysician-patients across the board. 
22 Hospitals with fewer than 100 births are excluded due to low match rates (this excludes 0.12 percent of births 
and 1 physician-parent). 
23 They also include indicators for whether the parents are married and whether the mother and father each 
report an occupation other than homemaking (these are not available in California). 
24 Mothers treated by physicians delivering fewer than 20 babies are excluded from the attending fixed effect 
analysis. This specification does not include hospital fixed effects because the majority of attendings deliver at only 
one hospital. 
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 nonphysicians to be informed, there is variance in information even among phy-
sicians. For example, gerentologists are less likely to have recent relevant clini-
cal experience. The model predicts less informed physicians will have C-section 
rates further from the clinical optimum. In panel B of Table 4, we interact the phy-
sician indicator with an indicator for whether the physician-patient specializes in 
an area of  medicine without direct relevance to childbirth.25 All else equal, physi-
cian-patients with the most relevant medical knowledge have the lowest C-section 
rates. The most informed physician-mothers have C-section rates that are around 
4 percentage points lower than nonphysicians (Table 4, panel B, row 1); mothers 
25 Physician-patients are classified as less informed if their specialty does not involve surgery (a C-section is 
abdominal surgery with all of the attendant risks and post-operative recovery) or anesthesiology, and if it plays 
no direct role in treating mothers or infants during or immediately after childbirth (OBs, pediatricians, and family 
medicine would therefore not be classified as less informed). 
Table 4—C-Sections and Physician Parents: Texas
Any C-section
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
 Physician-mother −2.79*** −2.09*** −3.10** −2.53*
[0.84] [0.62] [1.58] [1.53]
 Physician-father −0.38 0.40 −0.27 0.70
[0.72] [0.53] [1.21] [1.20]
 Hospital fixed effects? Yes
 Attending fixed effects? Yes
 Observations 372,691 372,691 101,839 101,839
 Adjusted  r 2 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.16
Panel B
 Physician-mother −4.13*** −3.26*** −4.65** −4.18**
[1.06] [0.91] [1.96] [1.99]
 Less informed physician-mother 3.07** 2.89* 3.82 4.12
[1.50] [1.50] [3.13] [3.12]
 Physician-father −1.92** −1.39** −1.90 −0.99
[0.75] [0.64] [1.54] [1.53]
 Less informed physician-father 3.94*** 4.07*** 4.31 4.76
[1.27] [1.22] [2.94] [2.90]
 Hospital fixed effects? Yes
 Attending fixed effects? Yes
 Observations 372,345 372,345 101,702 101,702
 Adjusted  r 2 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.16
notes: Columns 1 and 2 are for the full sample; columns 3 and 4 are for the subsample with attending names (years 
2005–2007). All regressions include maternal demographic controls, infant information, and clinical risk factors 
and year × month effects (see Table A.1). Panel B includes all the covariates in panel A and flags for being unable 
to identify physician specialty. Effects are displayed in percentage points. The mean of the dependent variable is 
32.6 percent (columns 1 and 2) and 38.8 percent (columns 3 and 4). Standard errors, clustered by hospital in col-
umns 1 and 2 and by attending in columns 3 and 4, are in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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in other  specialties have C-section rates that are only slightly lower than nonphy-
sicians (Table 4, panel B, sum of coefficients from rows 1 and 2).26 This provides 
direct evidence on the impact of information and medical knowledge on treatment. 
It suggests that it is the relevance of the medical knowledge to childbirth, not general 
medical knowledge, that leads to lower C-section rates. Moreover, it is not consis-
tent with the results being driven by differential treatment due to physicians’ status 
in hospitals.
The analysis thus far has focused on physician-mothers. In Texas, we are able 
to identify most births to physician-fathers (the father’s occupation is missing in 
15 percent of births). The mothers of physician-fathers’ babies do not have lower 
C-section rates on average (Table 4, panel A). However, this is at least partly due 
to the gender mix of medical specialties. Physician-fathers with the most relevant 
medical knowledge are less likely to have babies delivered via C-section (Table 4, 
panel B, row 3), although the magnitude is smaller than for physician-mothers. Even 
among the group of more informed physicians, physician-mothers could be overrep-
resented in the most informed specialties, such as obstetrics and gynecology.
B. financial incentives
Physician financial incentives are thought to be the primary impetus behind PID. 
We now directly test whether the gap between physician and nonphysician-patients 
varies with their providers’ financial incentives. Table 5 displays estimates of the 
coefficients in equation (3). As discussed above, we expect HMO-owned hospitals 
to have lower C-section rates than non-HMO-owned hospitals. The model also pre-
dicts physician-patients will be less affected by the incentive environment because 
they are more likely to be informed about appropriate treatment.
As expected, the coefficient on the HMO-owned hospital indicator is negative. 
Nonphysician-mothers delivering at HMO-owned hospitals have C-section rates 
that are almost 5 percentage points lower than nonphysicians delivering elsewhere 
(columns 1 and 2). Roughly half the difference comes from lower scheduled and 
unscheduled C-sections, respectively. The coefficient on HMO-owned hospital ( β 3 ) 
and the coefficient on the interaction between HMO-owned hospital and 
 physician-patient ( β 2 ) are close in magnitude and of opposite sign.27 Thus, unlike 
other patients, physicians appear to be unaffected by the contract environment of 
their providers. They have the same risk-adjusted C-section rates in and outside of 
HMO-owned hospitals. This is exactly what the model predicts. When broken out 
into scheduled and unscheduled C-sections the same pattern holds, although the 
estimates are less precise.
Enrolling in an HMO that operates its own hospitals is a choice. One poten-
tial concern is that physicians and nonphysicians could differentially sort into these 
26 Nurses are another natural group to study. They have more medical knowledge than the average person, but 
less than physicians. All else equal, mothers who are nurses have a marginally significant 1 percentage point lower 
C-section rate even after controlling for the attending physician. There is likely enormous variation in the medical 
knowledge of those who self-identify as nurses. 
27 p-values from the test of the null that  β 2 +  β 3 = 0 are 0.79 and 0.92 for the regressions displayed in col-
umns 1 and 2, respectively. For the regressions in columns 5 and 6, they are 0.90 and 0.80. 
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hospitals.28 Results are robust to restricting the comparison group to families with 
highly educated mothers, who may be more similar to physicians (Table  6, col-
umns 1 and 2). To further investigate socioeconomic differences, Table 6, columns 3 
and 4, provide estimates with maternal ZIP code fixed effects in place of HSA fixed 
effects. If differential sorting based on socioeconomic status is driving results, one 
would expect the effect size to be diminished by this change. Estimates are virtu-
ally identical to those in Table 5. For the pattern of results above to be due to sort-
ing, the differences between physician- and nonphysician-patients would have to 
reverse across the financial incentive environment. Additionally, if physicians and 
nonphysicians are differentially sorted, this would likely be reflected in the rates 
at which they choose to deliver at the closest hospital to their home and the dis-
tance they are willing to travel to their hospital of choice. Physician-patients and 
 nonphysician-patients both in and outside of HMO-owned hospitals are equally 
likely to deliver at the closest hospital and travel comparable distances to their deliv-
ery hospital (Table A.1 in the online Data Appendix). In addition, we get the same 
pattern of results for patients who chose to deliver at their closest hospital (Table 6, 
columns 5 and 6) and patients who bypassed the closest facility to get to their deliv-
ery hospital (Table 6, columns 7 and 8). Of course we cannot rule out that physician- 
and nonphysician-patients differentially sort into HMO-owned hospitals based on 
factors that are not reflected in hospital location. If these factors are not absorbed by 
observed factors, bias could result.
28 Results are robust to including hospital fixed effects in lieu of the HMO-owned hospital indicator (see 
Supplementary Table A.3 in the online Appendix). This suggests they are not due to physicians differentially  sorting 
to hospitals within the HMO system. 
Table 5—C-Sections and Physician-Mothers—HMO and Non-HMO Hospitals
Any C-section Scheduled Unscheduled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physician −2.04** −1.89** 0.12 0.12 −2.16*** −2.01**
[0.80] [0.77] [0.50] [0.48] [0.76] [0.78]
HMOHosp × physician 5.53** 4.75** 2.88* 2.44* 2.64 2.31
[2.29] [2.23] [1.47] [1.44] [1.86] [1.86]
HMOHosp −4.94*** −4.58*** −2.05*** −1.74*** −2.89*** −2.84***
[0.43] [0.49] [0.26] [0.26] [0.35] [0.41]
HSA fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 580,719 580,719 580,719 580,719 580,719 580,719
Adjusted r 2 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.064 0.066
notes: Regressions include controls as in panel A of Table 3, with the exception of HMO patient, which is excluded. 
Physician is an indicator that the mother is a physician and HMOHosp is an indicator that the birth took place in 
an HMO-owned hospital. Effects are displayed in percentage points. Standard errors, clustered by maternal HSA, 
are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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C. Maternal and infant Morbidity
The estimates above demonstrate that physician-mothers receive different treat-
ment in birth than comparable nonphysicians. However, are physicians receiving 
better care or just different care? Are they using their medical knowledge to get 
more clinically appropriate treatment or are they being permitted to choose higher 
risk treatment plans? The model predicts nonphysicians’ treatment will deviate from 
the clinical optimum, and they will therefore have higher morbidity. If, alternatively, 
physician-mothers were pursuing high risk treatment paths or placing more weight 
on their own health relative to their infants’, one would expect them or their infants 
to have higher morbidity rates. They do not.
Infant and maternal death in childbirth are incredibly rare in the United States. 
The overall maternal death rate in California is only 8 per 100,000  college-educated 
women, and no physician-mothers died in our sample. Infant and maternal com-
plications during and immediately following childbirth are more common. Table 7 
includes the conditions we observe in at least 1 percent of births and their means (See 
Table A.1 for more detail). Almost 9 percent of mothers have third or fourth degree 
perineal lacerations, which are serious tears sustained during labor.  Post-partum 
hemorrhage, a more severe complication, is less common (3 percent) as is maternal 
infection (4.5 percent). For infants, we observe the presence of meconium (4.1 per-
cent), respiratory conditions, infection (2.0 percent), and delivery trauma (1.2 per-
cent). We split respiratory conditions into the less serious conditions that require 
oxygen therapy or mechanical ventilation (2.7 percent) and the more severe cases 
that require intubation (2.5 percent).
Because even these conditions are relatively infrequent, we estimate logit regres-
sions as in equation (4). Table 7 displays the average marginal effects (AMEs). 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Physician −2.20*** −2.06*** −2.18*** −1.94*** −3.08* −2.67 −1.87** −1.78**
[0.78] [0.79] [0.68] [0.69] [1.57] [1.64] [0.88] [0.89]
HMOHosp 2.85 2.49 2.66 2.28 3.93 3.17 2.32 2.02
 × physician [1.93] [1.93] [1.80] [1.80] [4.80] [4.71] [2.03] [2.03]
HMOHosp −3.03*** −2.86*** −2.89*** −2.87*** −3.60*** −3.30*** −2.71*** −2.65***
[0.34] [0.37] [0.17] [0.18] [0.59] [1.02] [0.35] [0.39]
Fixed effects? HSA ZIP HSA HSA
Observations 226,323 226,323 582,528 582,528 129,188 129,188 451,531 451,531
Adjusted r 2 0.063 0.065 0.064 0.066 0.062 0.068 0.064 0.066
notes: Regressions include controls as in panel A of Table 3, with the exception of HMO patient, which is excluded. 
Physician is an indicator that the mother is a physician and HMOHosp is an indicator that the birth took place in an 
HMO-owned hospital. Effects are displayed in percentage points. Standard errors, clustered by HSA (columns 1–2 
and 5–8) and ZIP code (columns 3–4) are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Overall, physician-mothers have better outcomes. Outside of HMO-owned hospi-
tals, physician-mothers have significantly lower rates of laceration (1.15 ppts) and 
infection (1.17 ppts) compared with nonphysicians. These suggest that the mar-
ginal vaginal delivery does not require extended or difficult active labors. The lac-
eration result is striking given physician-mothers’ higher rates of vaginal delivery. 
Lacerations result from vaginal deliveries, while infection and maternal hemorrhage 
can arise in women delivering vaginally or by C-section. Thus, the reduced rate of 
infection could arise from physicians having fewer C-sections and associated surgi-
cal wounds at risk for infection or they could have lower infection rates even within 
delivery method categories. Additionally, while physician-mothers are unlikely to 
be able to reduce their rates of laceration or hemorrhage through self-care, they may 
be able to reduce their risk of infection after delivery.29
Infants born to physician-mothers have lower rates of meconium (0.65 ppts), 
trauma (0.31 ppts), and intubation (0.42 ppts). While other effects are less precisely 
estimated, they are all negative, suggesting that physician-mothers are not achiev-
ing their lower C-Section rates by persisting in more perilous labors, nor are they 
improving their own morbidity by risking the health of their infants.30 Moreover, the 
results suggest overuse outside of HMO-owned hospitals adversely impacts patients.
29 Readmission to the hospital is even more subject to the physician self-care concern. That said, 
 physician-mothers and their babies are also less likely to be readmitted in the 14 days after delivery. 
30 The Texas VS data includes 1 and 5-minute APGAR scores. While estimates are imprecise, we find no evi-
dence of differential APGAR scores (see Supplementary Table A.4). 
Table 7—Maternal and Infant Outcomes—Average Marginal Effects
Maternal morbidity Infant morbidity
Laceration Hemorrhage Infection Meconium
Respiratory
assistance Intubation Infection Trauma
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Physiciana −1.15*** −0.020 −1.17*** −0.65* −0.041 −0.42* −0.28 −0.31*
[0.43] [0.35] [0.42] [0.39] [0.30] [0.22] [0.24] [0.17]
HMOHosp 0.22 −1.74* 1.78* −0.70 −0.75 −0.77 −0.25 −0.063
 × physician [1.48] [0.89] [1.02] [0.78] [0.99] [0.57] [0.39] [0.41]
HMOHospb 3.37*** 1.77*** 0.32 −0.89* 1.60*** −0.023 −1.03*** −0.26***
[0.54] [0.43] [0.45] [0.52] [0.53] [0.29] [0.11] [0.088]
HSA fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 580,690 580,614 580,212 580,399 579,557 580,188 580,080 578,579
Pseudo  r 2 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.072 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.050
Mean of dependent 8.9 3.1 4.5 4.1 2.7 2.5 2.0 1.2
 variable
notes: Average marginal effects from logit regressions including controls as detailed in Table 5 are displayed in per-
centage points. The construction of the morbidity measures is described in Section IVC. Sample sizes vary across 
columns when one or more HSAs is dropped during logit estimation. Standard errors, clustered by HSA, are in 
brackets.
a HMOHosp is set to zero in the AME integration.
b Physician is set to zero in the AME integration.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Inside HMO-owned hospitals the health consequences of reduced C-sections 
are less clear cut. Nonphysician-mothers delivering in this setting experience sig-
nificantly higher rates of laceration and post-partum hemorrhage (3.37 ppts and 
1.77 ppts, respectively). However, mothers in this setting are avoiding major abdom-
inal surgery (C-sections), and they may prefer an increased risk of complications to 
a guaranteed surgical incision. Physician-mothers appear to be able to avoid some 
but not all of the increased morbidity in HMO-owned hospitals. They are entirely 
able to avoid the increase in the most severe maternal complication, hemorrhage 
(the AMEs of the HMO-owned hospital indicator and interaction term are nearly 
equal and offsetting). Results for infants in the HMO-owned hospital setting are 
mixed. They have lower rates of meconium, infection, and trauma, but higher rates 
of respiratory assistance. Being an informed patient offsets approximately half of 
the respiratory assistance effect.
The above suggests that informed patients are not simply receiving different care. 
Informed patients’ and their infants’ health outcomes suggest they are receiving 
better care, as the model predicts.
D. Additional Treatment Margins
The estimates above strongly suggest that physician-patients are able to mitigate 
demand inducement on the C-section margin. However, there are several other key 
treatment decisions in childbirth. A question is whether the difference in C-section 
rates arises from differences on these other margins that then make a C-section less 
necessary. Two such margins are labor induction and the use of epidural anesthesia. 
Finally, as the second stage of labor progresses, the attending can attempt to aid in 
the delivery through the use of forceps or a vacuum extractor.
Table 8 presents estimates of equation (3) using indicators for induction, for-
ceps, and vacuum as dependent variables. Physician-mothers are significantly more 
likely to be induced, thus physicians are not avoiding C-sections through lower rates 
of induction (Table 8, column 1). They are also not substituting forceps or vac-
uum extractions for C-sections. Physician-mothers are significantly less likely to 
be delivered by vacuum extraction, and there is no measurable difference in the 
use of forceps. The use of epidural anesthesia is available on the Texas birth cer-
tificate after 2004. We find physician-parents are more likely to get epidurals, sug-
gesting differential use of epidurals is not driving their lower C-section rate and that 
physicians are not opposed to medical interventions in birth more generally (see 
Supplementary Table A.4).
The treatment decisions investigated above constitute the major medical inter-
ventions in childbirth, but are not the only treatments provided. Moreover, while 
the average vaginal birth is cheaper than a C-section, safely performing the mar-
ginal vaginal birth could require more resources both during the birth and to treat 
any complications that arise. If either physicians or their infants have adverse 
outcomes on margins not cataloged in the discharge data, one would expect them 
to require additional medical care. Hospital charges provide a summary measure 
of total  treatment provided. Though payers typically receive a large discount on 
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hospital charges, multiplicative discount factors will be absorbed by hospital fixed 
effects.31
Hospital charges are only available for births outside HMO-owned hospi-
tals. Columns 4–6 of Table 8 therefore display estimates from regressions of the 
form of equation (1) with log hospital charges as the dependent variable. Charges 
of  physician-mothers and their infants are nearly 2.6 percent lower than those of 
 nonphysician-mothers delivering in the same hospitals (column 5). If this reduction 
could be achieved in the broader US population, hospital charges would be reduced 
by $2 billion per year.32 Over a third of these savings are attributable to the differ-
ence in delivery method in the two groups. However, even after accounting for dif-
ferences in the use of C-Sections, physician-mothers and their infants have hospital 
charges that are 1.6 percent lower than other comparable patients, a difference of 
$497 per birth.
31 It is also important to note that hospital charges do not include physician charges or unbilled care, such as the 
amount of time a physician spends with the patient. 
32 This may overestimate the amount of hospital costs avoided. Percentages may be more informative, as costs 
paid are typically a fixed fraction of charges. On the other hand, this estimate does not include any cost savings 
associated with reduced readmissions due to complications from C-sections. 












Physician 1.67** −1.31* 0.086 −3.93** −2.57*** −1.55*
[0.67] [0.71] [0.25] [1.69] [0.94] [0.82]
HMOHosp × physician 3.39** 2.49 −0.055
[1.62] [1.63] [0.57]






Fixed effects? HSA HSA HSA Hospital Hospital
Observations 580,719 580,719 580,719 482,333 482,333 482,333
Adjusted  r 2 0.060 0.029 0.013 0.40 0.57 0.68
Mean of dependent variable 15.8 16.0 2.0 19,124
notes: Regressions include the full set of controls described in Table 3, panel A. In columns 1–3 the sample includes 
all hospitals, and these regressions exclude the HMO insurance variable; in columns 4–6 the sample is all non-
HMO-owned hospitals. Standard errors, clustered by HSA in columns 1–3 and by hospital in columns 4–6, are in 
parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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V. Discussion
We have shown that physician-patients receive different treatment in childbirth, 
appear to be more immune to their treating OB’s financial incentives, and that they 
and their infants have better health outcomes. Our preferred explanation of these 
findings is that there is less of an information asymmetry between physician-patients 
and their OBs and that this makes them less susceptible to PID. Below we consider 
alternatives to patient information. Each may explain any one of our findings in 
isolation, but the full pattern of results suggests patient information is the key factor.
We observe treatments, but not the OB’s recommendations. It is therefore 
possible that OBs recommend the same treatments to all their patients, but that 
 physician-patients’ preferences for C-sections differ from nonphysicians’ for rea-
sons unrelated to their clinical knowledge. For example, even among highly edu-
cated women, physicians are relatively highly compensated and often work either 
as sole proprietors or in group practices where maternity leave is costly. The most 
informed physician-mothers could be choosing a higher clinical threshold for 
C-sections due to their high cost of time away from work (although this would not 
explain why the babies of the most informed physician-fathers are also less likely 
to be delivered by C-section). If this were driving results, one would expect women 
who are self-employed to also have lower C-section rates. However, self-employed 
women and business owners have C-section rates that are similar to other educated 
women (Supplementary Table A.5). Furthermore, we have shown that physician-pa-
tients do not appear to be opposed to medical intervention in general or even to 
interventions that may increase the need for a C-section. They are more likely to 
get epidural anesthesia and inductions. Moreover, for differences in preferences to 
explain the results, the difference would have to reverse with the financial incentive 
environment. This might be possible if physicians and nonphysicians differentially 
sorted into HMO-owned hospitals. However, we have shown that physicians and 
nonphysicians are equally likely to deliver at the closest hospital to their homes; and 
they drive similar distances to get to their delivery hospital.
Physician-patients could also differ in their risk preferences or in their ability 
to make decisions under uncertainty. To explain our pattern of results, one would 
need the relative processing deficiencies or risk preferences to shift across financial 
incentive environments and across physician specialties. Even if you exclude sur-
geons, who may have more experience with high stakes decision-making, from the 
analysis, the most informed specialties still have lower C-section rates. In addition, 
if physicians were taking on more risk, one would expect them to experience more 
adverse outcomes or to require more treatment. Neither appears to be the case.
Even if physician-patients have the same preferences for risk, their OBs may be 
less risk-averse when treating them. Fear of malpractice lawsuits is often cited as a 
potential driver of C-sections. If OBs believe physician-patients will be less likely 
to sue in the event of a bad outcome, they might perform fewer C-sections on them. 
However, to explain the above results, OBs would need to believe that the risk of a 
lawsuit varies with patients’ medical specialties. Moreover, we find similar results 
in California and Texas, states with very different malpractice environments. If any-
thing, there is a larger effect in Texas, where the malpractice environment is more 
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favorable to OBs. Finally, if the results were due to OBs being less risk-averse in 
their treatment of physician-patients, we would expect their infants to have equal or 
worse outcomes than nonphysicians’ infants. That is not the case.
An alternative to PID that we cannot entirely rule out is OBs treating 
 physician-patients differently out of professional courtesy.33 One might be con-
cerned that the better outcomes of physician-patients and their infants are due not 
to the intensity of their treatment, but to differences in the unobserved quality or 
quantity of care they receive. However, if such a phenomenon were to exist, it would 
have to be driven entirely by a difference in attention and uncompensated effort, 
as charges and ancillary treatments are, if anything, lower for physician-patients. 
Results are also similar when teaching hospitals are excluded, further suggesting 
differential attention from attendings and residents in teaching hospitals is not driv-
ing results.
Finally, the effects we document may not be solely due to the treating of OB’s 
financial incentives. Physician and hospital incentives likely covary. HMO-owned 
hospitals internalize the costs of care and face an incentive to reduce C-sections. 
Non-HMO-owned hospitals are likely reimbursed more for C-sections than their 
higher costs justify. The physician ultimately makes treatment recommendations, 
but hospitals may be able to influence physicians in the direction of their interests. 
To the extent the hospital does incentivize physicians, it would still be a form of 
PID. If the hospital affects treatment directly through policies that constrain physi-
cian choice, then our estimates would encompass the effects of both physician and 
hospital incentives. However, the lower C-section rates do not appear to result from 
differential treatment of any single condition. Also, it is not clear how much lever-
age non-HMO-owned hospitals have over OBs with privileges.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presents an induced demand model, highlighting the interaction 
between patient information and provider financial incentives and tests its predic-
tions using data on childbirth. Consistent with the model, physician-mothers are 
7.5 percent less likely to have a C-section, and physician-mothers with the most 
relevant medical knowledge are 12.7 percent less likely to have a C-section. Outside 
of HMO-owned hospitals, the difference in C-section rates comes entirely from 
unscheduled C-sections; it arises from treatment decisions among mothers who 
chose to attempt labor. Sorting across hospitals and attendings explains only 20 per-
cent of this difference. It also appears informed patients are able to avoid the impact 
of their provider’s financial incentives. While patients in HMO-owned hospitals 
have significantly lower C-section rates (5 percentage points), physician-patients 
have similar C-section rates inside and outside of HMO-owned hospitals.
Physician-mothers are not avoiding C-sections by substituting other forms of 
resource-intensive care. Physicians have lower hospital charges and are less likely 
to have vacuum extractions. It appears physicians are able to achieve at least as 
33 If professional courtesy arises from the fact that a physician-patient will know if anything less than optimal 
care is provided or any related reputational concerns, then it is a manifestation of PID. 
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good or better health outcomes while receiving less intensive treatment. This is 
 consistent with our induced demand model—informed patients are able to prevent 
being moved away from their optimum. While the results taken together are strongly 
suggestive of PID as the primary driver, we of course cannot rule out that the true 
cause is some other unobserved dimension on which physician-patients differ.
Outside of HMO-owned hospitals, PID clearly lowers social welfare. C-section 
rates, morbidity, and hospital costs are higher for the marginal patient, and the 
higher C-section rate means longer recovery times for mothers. The socially 
optimal C-section rate may be even lower than the rate of physician-patients. 
 Physician-patients are likely targeting a private optimum, and, like all patients with 
insurance, they do not face the full marginal cost of their care. Inside  HMO-owned 
hospitals the impact of PID on social welfare is less clear. OBs provide fewer 
C-sections, but there appear to be some tradeoffs in morbidity. The socially optimal 
level of risk is not zero, therefore lower C-section rates with higher morbidity could 
be  welfare- improving. Considering only the financial costs borne by the hospital 
(and thus the HMO), this trade-off appears to pass cost-benefit analysis: the increase 
in hospital costs associated with the higher morbidity is substantially lower than our 
estimates of direct savings due to eliminated C-sections.34 This exercise, of course, 
does not take into account any non-hospital costs or benefits, including impacts on 
patient welfare.
This paper demonstrates that approximately 10 percent of C-sections represent 
overuse of healthcare and that this overuse is not only costly but may adversely 
impact patients. This study also provides suggestive evidence that efforts to improve 
patient knowledge and information could improve outcomes while reducing health 
costs. Information interventions will not provide patients with the same level of 
information that physicians have. However, if all patients could be treated the way 
physicians are treated, hospital and physician charges could be reduced by 3 percent 
or nearly $2 billion,35 and we would nearly achieve the US Government’s Healthy 
People 2020 goal of reducing primary C-sections by 2.6 percentage points. If all 
patients could be treated like the most informed physician-patients, then the Healthy 
People 2020 goal would be exceeded. Over the period we study, the C-section 
rate increased from 20 to 32 percent. Changes in patient information or physician 
financial incentives are unlikely to have been large enough to explain this dramatic 
increase. Future research will need to disentangle the other factors clearly at work. 
One candidate is hospital policies and standards of care. Even a physician-patient is 
limited in how far she can deviate from standard practice and norms.
34 We regress hospital charges on indicators for observed morbidities using the specification of column 5 in 
Table 8 (coefficients are in Supplementary Table A.6). We then multiply these charges by estimates of the increase 
in morbidity for each measure (from Table 7). While the conditions are expensive to treat, they are so rare that, sum-
ming across all measures, the expected costs arising from differential morbidity is only $25 for the average patient 
($155 if one ignores margins with improved morbidity). These are well below the cost of a C-section. 
35 Calculations are based on the California estimates. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest inducement on 
the C-section margin represents only approximately $30 million in physician fees (1 percent of physician incomes). 
Physician fees average $1,926 for vaginal deliveries and $2,295 for C-sections (Medicare). Inducing demand 
increases OB’s income from the average patient by 0.02 ($2,295–$1,926). This is compared with average fees of 
0.292 × 2,295 + (1 − 0.292) × 1,926. 
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